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Functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) has transformed the 
empirical study of the human mind in the 
21st century in a fundamental way. The 
groundbreaking research involving the use 
of fMRI brought a variety of arguments on 
what fMRI can and cannot tell to ethical, 
legal, social issues and the implications of 
use of such technology in many domains 
including education (see Berker, 2009, 
Celone & Stern, 2009; Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 
2001 and Raizada, & Kriegeskorte, 2010). 
Despite the abundance of studies either 
utilizing fMRI or addressing fMRI, the issue 
of the use of fMRI is continuing to be a 
vigorous area of research. 
 
fMRI is a non-invasive brain 
imaging technique that does not involve 
radiation (Byars, Holland, Strawsburg, 
Bommer, Dunn, Schmithorst, & Plante, 
2002). fMRI has opened a new window into 
neuroimaging by attempting to provide real 
time information on the functions of the 
brain. It is based on a technology, which 
provides functional maps of the working 
brain by tracking changes in the magnetic 
signals resulting from oxygenated and 
deoxygenated hemoglobin (Gligorov & 
Krieger, 2010; Ogawa, Lee, Nayak, & 
Glynn, 1990; Vanmeter, 2010). This method 
is known as BOLD (Blood Oxygenation 
Level Dependent). Neural activation 
produces a physical effect on red blood cells 
by moving them from a state of oxygenation 
to deoxygenation (Cumming & Ramsey, 
2009). While the magnetic field produced by 
oxygenated hemoglobin has almost no effect 
(or no effect) on the MRI signal, 
deoxygenated hemoglobin has a weak effect 
on the MRI signal (Vanmeter, 2010). Even 
though changes in such signals are very 
small, they can be detected while the subject 
is performing cognitive tasks (Celone & 
Stern, 2009; Ogawa, Lee, Nayak, & Glynn, 
1990). Here, fMRI attempts to pair the 
neural activity with local cerebral blood 
flow. The changes in the blood flow are 
associated with the task the individual is 
engaged in (Craighead & Nemeroff, 2001). 
Abstract 
 This paper is aimed at addressing some of the main issues with regard to use of 
neuroimaging (i.e., fMRI) in educational settings; such as the issue of equating structure 
with function; the issue of finding an accurate reference point for normal brain structure and 
function; issues due to brain plasticity; and issues related to the interpretation of 
neuroimaging findings. In addition, the implications of such concerns were addressed. It was 
concluded that the lack of research on the issues regarding the use of neuroimaging 
jeopardizes the possible use of such unique technology and any educational practice based 
on neuroimaging would be at best prematurely done unless such issues are satisfactorily 
addressed. We should leave open the possibility and viability that neuroscience (inclusive of 
neuroimaging) can, and perhaps should indeed be used to develop educational programs, but 
if (if and only if) pragmatic assessment of both the science/technology and its ethical, legal 










           The groundbreaking research 
involving the use of fMRI has brought a 
variety of arguments from what fMRI can 
and cannot tell, the implications of the use 
of such technology in many domains 
including education, and to the ethical, legal, 
and social issues with regard to fMRI. Such 
possible implications of the use of fMRI are 
under question due to the validity issues 
regarding fMRI findings. 
 
1. Concerns with regard to the validity of 
fMRI 
 
1.1. Equating structure and function 
 
Just because there is some activity in 
the certain structure of the brain, does this 
really mean that specific parts of the brain 
are involved in the function? Another 
question being raised is: “Does this activity 
mean that the certain structure of the brain 
alone is responsible for such function?” 
(Racine, Bell, & Illes, 2010; Rosen & Gur, 
2002; Illes, Racine, & Kirschen, 2006). A 
false activation which can be caused by 
ordinary things like eye-blink (see Desmond 
& Chen, 2002) or movement during fMRI 
scanning can pose a problem to the validity 
of fMRI findings. Special types of statistical 
analysis are required to eliminate such 
distortion of the fMRI results (see Racine, 
Bell, & Illes, 2010 and Vanmeter, 2010) 
otherwise the validity of the result would be 
questionable. 
 
1.2. Accurate reference point for normal 
brain structure and function  
 
Due to the non-quantitative nature of 
fMRI results, comparison of the results 
obtained from more than one task is required 
(VanMeter, 2010). The accuracy of the 
reference point is a necessity for any 
comparison, intrapersonal and interpersonal.  
The question is “do we have an accurate 
reference point for normal brain structure 
and function?” For instance, functional 
imaging can produce different results based 
on the technique it utilizes; oxygen 
consumption (fMRI) versus glucose 
utilization (PET) (see, Fox, & Raichle, 
1986; Fox, Raichle, Mintun, & Dence, 
1988). “The BOLD contrast mechanism 
reflects the input and intracortical 
processing of a given area rather than its 
spiking output” (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, 
Trinath & Oeltermann (2001, p.150). 
Namely, while an fMRI signal detects the 
input in the local field, it does not detect 
total output with regard to the stimulus 
(Kosik, 2003). There is vagueness 
concerning reference point information 
when attempting to address this issue 
(Santosh 2000 and Wilke et al. 2003 as cited 
in Fenton, Meynell, & Baylis, 2009). 
Without a solid reference point, the validity 
of fMRI findings would be questionable. 
 
1.3. Brain plasticity 
   
Given the fact that the brain has 
plasticity, meaning lifelong capability of the 
brain (1) to adjust itself (i.e., physically, 
chemically or physiologically) to the 
changes that occur in the environment and 
(2) to recompense for brain trepidation, 
including damage. One thing to remember 
about plasticity is that it takes place in ways 
that are not foreseeable. This means, the 
same experience may affect the brain in 
different ways (Kolb & Teskey, 2011) 
intrapersonal and interpersonal. This raises a 
question of the validity of the fMRI results 
obtained from children (in terms of making 
function-structure association) due to rapidly 










1.4. Subjective perceptions of qualitative 
data 
 
The question raised by Hanan A. 
Alexander (2006) needs serious attention as 
we make further moves with fMRI and its 
educational implications:  “how educational 
researchers can believe the subjective 
perceptions of qualitative participant-
observers given the concern for objectivity 
and generalisability of experimental research 
in the behavioural and social sciences” (p. 
205).  
 
1.5. Post hoc ergo propter hoc 
 
Just because there is activity in 
certain parts of the brain immediately after 
the cognitive task has been performed, can 
we say that task and activation are related or 
have a causal relationship? The answer to 
this question is “not always,” which brings 
us the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc 
issue (J. Giordano, personal communication, 
July 2011).  Post hoc ergo propter hoc 
means “after this, therefore because of this” 
in Latin, which refers to an erroneous logic 
of causation between two events by the 
faulty conclusion that an event is caused by 
another event simply because it came after 
it. Namely, if X occurs after Y, then Y is the 
cause of X. Just because something is 
followed by something else, does not 
necessarily mean the former caused the 
latter (Copi & Cohen, 1990; Lerner, 2002; 
Schmookler, 1999). Even though there are 
statistical techniques for preventing such 
fallacy of indicating a cause-effect sequence, 
yet, “unfortunately the number of variables 
involved usually vastly exceeds the number 
of equations to be worked with, which 
means that analysis can yield no certain 




1.6. Uniqueness of cognitive strategies 
 
Because each individual is unique, 
individuals may use their brain in different 
ways. This means, the activation in the brain 
of one individual might be quite different or 
take place in different parts of the brain 
compared to another individual who is 
involved in the same cognitive task.  
 
1.7. Statistical analysis of fMRI data 
 
Statistical analysis employed to 
correct the motion artifacts, setting the 
threshold for a general linear model 
regression, comparison of several tens 
thousands of statistical analysis, and 
obtaining false negatives and/or false 
positives pose a serious concern with regard 
to the accuracy of mapping brain function 
attained from such complex analysis 
(Racine, Bell, & Illes, 2010). The changes in 
results of fMRI not related to the cognitive 
task the individual is experiencing (i.e., 
number of hours of sleep before the 
experiment, Habeck et al. 2004 as cited in 
VanMeter, 2010) can pose a problem with 
regard to the interpretation of the data.  
 
2. Issues with regard to use of fMRI in 
education of children 
 
What are the possible uses of fMRI 
in education? Some possible uses of fMRI in 
the educational system are (1) to identify 
students whose education could be promoted 
by offering additional resources that are 
more appropriate to their ‘perceived’ 
cognitive abilities (i.e., exceptional 
learners); (2) to channel students into more 
appropriate programs based on their 
cognitive abilities; (3) to identify children 
with potential troublesome dispositions (i.e., 
violent) (Celone, & Stern, 2009; Fenton, 
Meynell, & Baylis, 2009). The question here 






accurate results than what is currently done 
with psychological and behavioral testing 
for diagnosing purposes. Even though, 
currently, the answer to this question is 
unclear, in the near future, validity and 
interpretative issues with regard to fMRI 
may be improved.   
 
One of the main issues regarding the 
use of fMRI in education is that the use of 
such technology may lead to categorization 
of children based on their neural 
mechanism. Such categorization relies on 
the assumption that all children use the same 
neural process when they are learning. This 
assumption simplifies the learning process 
as there is more than one way of learning the 
same subject/topic. Focusing on a single 
component that is involved in learning (i.e., 
memory), reduces learning process to a 
component of learning (Pierce, 2009). This 
brings the issue of mereological fallacy (J. 
Giordano, personal communication, July 
2011), which refers to the logic of 
establishing a relationship between parts and 
the whole in a way that regards a part as if it 
is the whole (Maslin, 2007). Referring to a 
study skills booklet, Maslin (2007) gives an 
example for such fallacy. According to this 
booklet, the left hemisphere of the brain 
thinks with words, while the right 
hemisphere thinks with images and pictures. 
Maslin argues that such claims are 
meaningless as they attribute cognitive 
activities to “the brain considered as a 
whole, much less to parts of brains” (p. 
211). This fallacy becomes especially 
problematic in studies dealing with 
neuroscience. 1 Similar to this fallacy, 
                                                          
1 According to Bennett and Hacker (2003), assigning 
psychological attributions, (i.e., thinking, believing, 
interpreting, inferring, knowing, reasoning, deciding), 
to the brain or a part/section of a brain (i.e., the 
hemispheres or even neurons) are rooted from 
Cartesianism, and are far from scientific claims, 
rather philosophical claims. For a detailed discussion 
reductionism as labeled by Bennett and 
Hacker (2003), also poses a problematic 
view on the learning process. For instance, 
according to Francis Crick (1995):  
 
“The scientific belief is that our 
minds—the behavior of our brains—
can be explained by the interactions 
of nerve cells (and other cells) and 
the molecules associated with them.* 
This is to most people a really 
surprising concept. It does not come 
easily to believe that I am the 
detailed behavior of a set of nerve 
cells, however many there may be 
and however intricate their 
interactions” (p.7).  
 
Along with these simplifications 
with regard to neural/cognitive process, 
categorizing children based on their neural 
mechanism, these assumptions disregard 
individual differences in learning. As it is 
clear for educators, individual differences in 
learning varies greatly; while some are 
visual learners others are auditory learners 
or kinesthetic learners, to name a few.  
Based on their learning style, individuals 
may use different neural pathways in the 
process of learning.  
 
Would categorizing children based 
on their neural mechanism lead to biological 
determinism? To answer this question we 
need to answer the following question “what 
does such categorization entail?” It entails 
the idea that the biological process alone 
shapes neural mechanism. This brings us the 
definition of biological determinism. 
Biological determinism, sometimes called 
genetic determinism, refers to the idea that 
                                                                                       
of the mereological fallacy in neuroscience, see M. R. 
Bennett and P. M. S. Hacker’s (2003) Philosophical 
Foundations of Neuroscience. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing.  
 





human characteristics and behaviors are 
shaped only by genes (De Melo-Martin, 
2005). It is well known that biology is not 
the only factor affecting the structure of the 
brain. Experience also shapes the biology of 
the brain. For this reason, neuroscience 
cannot or should not lead to a biological 
determinism (Farmer, 2010). If the brain is 
changing based on the factors rooted in the 
environment, then, the idea that genes alone 
are responsible for human behaviors become 
meaningless.   
 
Even though embracing 
neurotechnology does not necessarily lead to 
biological determination, this does not mean 
that neurotechnologies (including, but not 
limited to fMRI) will not be used to 
categorize children or adults. 
Neurobiological determination of 
social/practical categories, namely “neural 
norming,” may lead to “Euneuromics,”2 
meaning neurologically based “good” or 
“well.” 
 
Another issue regarding the use of 
fMRI in education involves the economical 
feasibility of utilizing such technology in 
educational settings. Given the economical 
difficulties facing today’s educational 
system, how feasible is it to utilize such 
technology in educational settings? The 
answer to this question is tied closely to the 
validity, reliability and usefulness of fMRI. 
The more studies conducted to address and 
eliminate such issues, the easier and more 
acceptable it would be to use fMRI in many 
different settings including educational 
settings. Once the main issues with regard to 
the interpretative difficulties are addressed 
properly and solutions are provided, the 
doors to common use of fMRI would be 
opened.    
 
                                                          
2 This term was generated by Dr. James Giordano.  
2.1. Parental consent issues 
 
Parent consent issues mainly revolve 
around health, safety, and privacy concerns.  
Because fMRI is a relatively new 
technology, its long terms effects on the 
brain are simply unknown. Just because this 
technology does not involve ionizing rays, 
does it make it safe, especially for children 
whose brains are rapidly changing? Because 
of the possibility that children’s forming 
brains might be at danger, it raises ethical 
concerns.  Would it be ethical for parents to 
give consent for non-clinical use of fMRI on 
their children given the possibility of 
negative effect(s) of such technology? 
Another issue regarding the parental consent 
is if it is ethical for parents to not give 
consent for non-clinical use of fMRI on their 
children, which may limit their children’s 
access to the best educational/health 
practices. Do parents have rights to deprive 
their children from a technology that could 
benefit their children’s education? What is 
the future of parental consent if fMRI 
becomes a widely used technology? Would 
we still need parental consent? Considering 
that parental consent is not needed to test 
children in school because it is a widely 
used practice, will fMRI be perceived as a 
common practice in the near future (J. 
Giordano, personal communication, July 
2011)?  
Use of fMRI can also be perceived 
as invasion of privacy of young children 
who are unable to make a judgment about 
such technology. Do parents have the right 
to let their children be brain-scanned even if 
it involves invasion of privacy? Would we, 
adults, mind that our brain be scanned 
knowing the possibility of invasion of 
privacy? If our answer is no to this question, 









2.2. Information sharing 
 
If fMRI becomes a commonly used 
technology, who should have access to the 
information obtained from fMRI? School 
systems? In the case that abnormalities 
having some possible educational 
implications were discovered during non-
clinical use of fMRI, should the school 
system be involved? Insurance companies? 
Should the information with regard to the 
unexpectedly discovered abnormalities be 
shared with insurance companies? If so, now 
should the child be considered to have a pre-
existing condition (J. Giordano, personal 
communication, July 2011)? What is the 
acceptable practice for accessing such 
information? What are the possible issues 
with regard to sharing such information with 
the child? How is this going to affect the 
perception of the self? (Psychological 
effects): Known self vs. newly constructed 
self, based on the results of fMRI. How is 
this going to affect the perception of others? 
(Sociological effects): Am I superior to the 
other kids? Do I deserve better than what I 
am offered?  or “I knew there was 
something wrong with me, now I have the 
proof.” 
 
How would information sharing 
affect the child’s school performance? “The 
more I know about how my brain works, the 
more I can adjust my strategies (and/or my 
environment) to learn” (positive effect). “If I 
am the brightest, do I really have to work 
hard anymore?” “I knew there was 
something wrong with me, I shouldn’t even 
try anymore!” (Negative effect). There is 
also a possibility that sharing such 
information would not affect the child’s 





2.3. Information security. 
In order to make sense of the fMRI 
data collected by large groups of people, 
comparison and sharing such data would be 
necessary. Securing such a database would 
be pivotal. How is this database going to be 
secured? What are the possible implications 
of failing to secure such data? What would 
be done to avoid or minimize inappropriate 
access, inapt use/misuse, data modification 
(by others or the individual himself/herself) 
and “downstream” effects (e.g.- individual 
and group socio- legal and economic 
demonstrations of accessed, misused or 
manipulated datasets) (Giordano, in press)?  
 
2.4. Use of fMRI for cognitive 
enhancement in children 
 
Brain mapping in terms of function 
may lead to the cognitive enhancement 
argument. If fMRI results show an abnormal 
or inadequate functioning in certain part of 
the child’s brain, this information may be 
utilized to either minimize the abnormality 
or enhance the cognitive skills. This brings 
the issue of “the ethics of enhancement.” 
Julian Savulescu (2009) listed the three main 
arguments with regard to the ethics of 
enhancement in humans. The first argument 
deals with the notion that the decision of not 
to enhance is wrong. The focal point of this 
argument is that if enhancement is going to 
improve the child’s life, failure to provide 
such enhancement would be unethical.  It is 
like depriving a child from a dietary 
supplement that would provide a stunning 
intellectual result. The second argument is 
that we need to be consistent with regard to 
different types of enhancement. We use 
environment to enhance children’s lives. 
Cognitive/biological enhancements should 
not be considered any differently because 
environmental enhancements change our 
biology as well. If we are okay with the idea 
to change our biology with environmental 





enhancements, then we should be consistent 
and approach biological enhancement in the 
same manner. The third argument revolves 
around the idea that if we were to be open to 
treatment, we should also be open to 
enhancements; therefore, enhancements 
should not be considered any differently 
than alleviating/treating disease. Preventing 
a disease or treating a disease leads to a 
good life, so do the enhancements.  
 
These arguments listed by Savulescu 
have strong points to consider, yet, it does 
not mean that there are no possible ethical 
concerns associated with such 
enhancements. One of the pivotal questions 
to be answered is “how far is too far with 
manipulation of biology or embracement of 
cognitive enhancements?”  
 
2.5. Policy issues 
 
Policy issues are closely related to 
justice issues. If fMRI becomes a widely 
used technology for enhancing children’s 
cognitive skills or eliminating possible 
future abnormalities, “who would receive 
this technology” would become one of the 
central questions; children who really need 
this technology to prevent abnormalities or 
children whose parents can afford such 
technology to enhance their children’s 
cognitive skills.  
  
If neurocognitive enhancements 
become prevalent, it is probable that it will 
not be rightfully available for all. However, 
such possible imbalanced access to 
neurocognitive enhancements should not be 
used as an excuse to prohibit these 
technological improvements as it is not the 
case for the practices performed by the 
prosperous such as tutoring or cosmetic 
surgery (Farah et al., 2010).  
 
While addressing the enhancement 
issue, Michael J. Sandel talks about a worry 
of generating two categories of human 
beings: the enhanced and the unenhanced 
(natural). Sandel (2009) argues that the real 
issue is not the access issue but the moral 
issue of enhancement and states that “the 
fundamental question is not how to ensure 
equal access to enhancement but whether we 
should aspire to it in the first place” (p. 892). 
This question must be clearly answered 
before any policy making takes place.   
 
As our knowledge about how our 
brain works progresses, such knowledge will 
hold potential to have a huge impact on 
every aspect of our life, including but not 
limited to education. Policies addressing 
neuroethics cannot be made without the 
existence of progressive and integrative 
neuroethics that generate some benefit vs. 
risk analysis (Giordano, 2011 as cited in 
Giordano, in press). That is, neuroethics 
must develop enough to produce 
multidisciplinary perspective on benefits vs. 
risks analysis of using such technology. 
Developing a framework is a pivotal step 
with regard to policy making. To do so, 
implementing workshops and discussions 
among various disciplines is pivotal.  Shared 
responsibility among regularity agencies and 
scientists from various backgrounds would 
provide means for protection and 
improvement of human life.  
 
3. Is the use of fMRI in education a 
science fiction or is it already happening? 
 
Neurotechnology is already in use in 
our daily life including the educational 
domain. For instance there are educational 
toys produced by neuroscientists. It seems 
that with the improvement on the 
neurotechnologies (i.e., fMRI), it is safe to 
assume that such technology would not be 






uses of fMRI in the domain of education 
depend heavily on the questions/issues 
raised in related literature. We have to 
answer at least the following questions to 
put fMRI into perspective: What can fMRI 
tell us about brain functions in children? 
What can fMRI not tell us about brain 
functions in children? What are the benefits 
and risks involving fMRI? These questions 
along with several other questions raised in 
this study may seem to involve an unlikely 
situation but exercising our judgment on 
such questions would help us be more 
prepared for use of fMRI.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
While novel technologies often 
provide new prospects that offer potentials 
for improving people’s lives, technologies 
also bring novel ethical concerns. It would 
be premature to dismiss the possible use of 
fMRI in educational purposes because of the 
concerns related to the use of such 
technology. It is obvious that more research 
is needed to guide the policies otherwise 
prematurely conducted research can result in 
unfortunate or harmful outcomes for 
children due to misguided policy making.3  
 
The issues mentioned above pose a 
very serious question on the usefulness of 
fMRI. If we were to utilize fMRI in the 
                                                          
3 Referring to The “Mozart effect,” DiPietro (2000) 
states that in 1998 Georgia State mandated that a 
recording of classical music to be distributed to all 
newborns for the purpose of promoting cognitive 
development. This practice was followed by other 
states despite the lack of research that support the 
“Mozart effect.” Music may indeed have some 
benefits for the babies; however, current research 
fails to provide a positive relation between exposure 
of the babies to music and cognitive improvements 
(DiPietro , 2000). An interesting point here is that 




education of children, such concerns must 
be eliminated or at least minimized as much 
as possible.   fMRI is a powerful technology 
that can be used to improve not only 
pedagogy but also educational settings. 
However, the lack of research addressing the 
issues mentioned above jeopardizes the 
possible use of such unique technology. Any 
educational practice based on fMRI (i.e., 
funneling students into appropriate 
educational programs, Celone & Stern, 
2009) would be at best prematurely done 
unless such issues are satisfactorily 
addressed. To do that, a multidisciplinary 
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